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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 The trustees of the United Mine Workers of America 1950 
Pension Benefit Plan and Trust ("the 1950 Plan"), and the United 
3 
Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Benefit Plan and Trust ("the 
1974 Plan") (collectively, "the Plans"),0 claim that Fawn Mining 
Corporation ("Fawn Mining") failed to fulfill its obligations 
under the 1988 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement ("Wage 
Agreement")0 when it failed to contribute to the 1950 Plan for 
its employees for the period of May 24, 1990, through April 30, 
1991.0  The trustees initiated this action pursuant to section 
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and 
section 502(e) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e), to collect these allegedly 
delinquent contributions.  Fawn Mining responded by filing a 
third-party complaint against District 5, United Mine Workers of 
America, AFL-CIO ("District 5"), and the United Mine Workers of 
America International, AFL-CIO ("International") (collectively, 
"the UMW"), alleging that it was not contractually obligated to 
                                                           
0The Plans were established through collective bargaining between 
the United Mine Workers of America and the employers in the 
bituminous coal industry and have been maintained under 
successive National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements. 
0Article XX(d) of the Wage Agreement provides that: 
 
During the life of this Agreement . . . each 
signatory Employer engaged in the production 
of coal shall contribute to the Trusts . . . 
the amounts specified below based on cents 
per ton on each ton . . . of bituminous coal 
produced by such Employer for use or for 
sale, and, in addition, each signatory 
Employer . . . shall contribute to the Trusts 
. . . the amounts specified below based on 
cents per hours worked by each of the 
Employer's Employees who perform classified 
work under this Agreement. 
0The plaintiff calculates this sum as $344,785.90, to which it 
also seeks to add "double interest" and costs and attorney's fees 
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). 
4 
contribute to the 1950 Plan because the UMW had agreed to exempt 
Fawn Mining from the portion of the Wage Agreement that required 
contribution to this plan.  Fawn Mining further claimed that if 
it were responsible for contributions to the 1950 Plan, it would 
be entitled to indemnification from the UMW.   
 Following discovery, all parties filed motions for 
summary judgment.  A magistrate considered these motions and 
prepared a report and recommendation.  The magistrate found that 
even assuming that the UMW agreed to waive Fawn Mining's 
contractual obligations regarding the 1950 Plan, this agreement 
would not be binding on the trustees of the benefit plan.  With 
regard to the union's liability to Fawn Mining, the magistrate 
concluded that there was no basis for requiring the UMW to 
indemnify Fawn Mining.  Thus, the magistrate judge recommended 
that the court grant both the Plans' and the UMW's motions for 
summary judgment, and deny Fawn Mining's motion for summary 
judgment.  The district court adopted the magistrate judge's 
report and recommendation as the opinion of the court.  Fawn 
Mining now appeals. 
 
I. 
 BethEnergy Mines, Inc. and Bethlehem Steel Corporation 
(collectively, "BethEnergy") intended to terminate operations at 
their Saxonburg, Pennsylvania coal mine facility and permanently 
lay-off all employees who worked at this site.  Those employees 
were represented by District 5.  When District 5 learned of the 
planned closing, it began to actively solicit prospective buyers 
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of the mine so that operations could continue and the jobs of its 
members could be saved.  Donald Redman ("Redman"), president of 
District 5, contacted principals of the CLI Corporation ("CLI") 
in January, 1990, to ask if CLI was interested in purchasing the 
mine.  CLI expressed interest in arranging for Fawn Mining, one 
of its subsidiaries, to purchase the mining assets from 
BethEnergy.   
 After some investigation, however, Fawn Mining 
representatives concluded that it would not be profitable for it 
to purchase the mine if it would be bound by the terms of the 
Wage Agreement, which BethEnergy and District 5 had previously 
signed.  This created a problem, however, because Article I of 
the Wage Agreement stated that: 
[E]ach employer promises that its operations 
covered by this Agreement shall not be sold, 
conveyed, or otherwise transferred or 
assigned to any successor without first 
securing the agreement of the successor to 
assume the Employer's obligations under this 
Agreement. 
 Fawn Mining thus knew that BethEnergy would not sell it 
the mining operation unless it either agreed to assume the terms 
of the Wage Agreement or gained concessions from the UMW 
regarding the requirements of that agreement.0  As a result, Fawn 
Mining representatives had numerous discussions with Redman 
regarding the Wage Agreement.  These discussions focused on the 
possibility of exempting Fawn Mining from the provision of the 
                                                           
0Because other subsidiaries of CLI had signed the 1988 Wage 
Agreement, CLI was well aware of the language of Article I 
prohibiting employers from selling their assets to successors 
that did not agree to abide by the agreement. 
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Wage Agreement that required employer contributions to the 1950 
Plan.  Redman, who stated at his deposition that his biggest 
concern was keeping the mine open and his members employed, 
admitted to having lengthy discussions with Fawn Mining regarding 
the possibility of granting Fawn Mining an exemption from 
participating in the 1950 Plan.   
 Redman told representatives of Fawn Mining that other 
companies that had purchased struggling mining operations were 
granted exemptions by the UMW from some of the terms of the 1988 
Wage Agreement, including the term requiring contribution to the 
1950 Plan.  Redman stated, either explicitly or implicitly, that 
he favored granting Fawn Mining an exemption from the requirement 
that it contribute to the 1950 Plan at some time down the road if 
it would keep the mine open and UMW members employed.  Fawn 
Mining representatives knew, however, that Redman alone did not 
have the authority to grant such an exemption.     
 The parties disagree about what exactly happened next. 
According to Fawn Mining representatives, Redman told them that 
he had spoken to the International President, and that the 
president had given him the authority to grant Fawn Mining an 
exemption from the 1950 Plan.  Fawn Mining representatives 
further testified that Redman promised them that if Fawn Mining 
purchased BethEnergy's assets, it would be immediately exempt 
from contributing to the 1950 Plan.  In other words, the 
collective bargaining agreement between Fawn Mining and the UMW 
would be identical to the Wage Agreement, except that it would 
not include a provision requiring contribution to the 1950 Plan.  
7 
 Redman, however, remembered the negotiations somewhat 
differently.  According to him, he made it clear to Fawn Mining 
representatives that he had no authority to grant an exemption 
from the 1950 Plan.  Furthermore, he claimed that he promised 
only that he would seek the exemption from International 
President Trumpka after Fawn Mining had operated the mine for one 
year.  Redman stated that he told Fawn Mining representatives he 
wanted to wait a year before granting the exemption because if 
operations continued for at least that much time, it would be 
clear that Fawn Mining was serious about turning the mining 
operations into a profitable business, and that it was possible 
to do so.  At that point, if it would help save the mine for the 
long term, Redman would seek the exemption. 
 While these negotiations between Fawn Mining and the 
UMW were taking place, BethEnergy issued a "WARN" notice 
announcing that it would close the mine on May 25, 1990 unless a 
purchaser who had a collective bargaining agreement with the UMW 
was found by that time.  Representatives of the UMW knew that 
once the mine was shut down, it would be even more difficult to 
find a purchaser and re-start operations.  So, on May 24, 1990, 
the day before the purchase deadline imposed by BethEnergy, Fawn 
Mining Vice President Robert Irey ("Irey") and CLI Chief 
Financial Officer William Stein ("Stein") met with Redman at the 
District 5 office to reaffirm understandings reached in the prior 
negotiations covering the mining operation.    
 At the end of this meeting, Redman and Irey both signed 
a single sheet of paper confirming their agreement.  This paper 
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was a copy of the last page of the 1988 Wage Agreement, which is 
the page that employers and local unions sign to indicate that 
they are consenting to becoming parties to that agreement.  At 
the time Redman and Irey signed this page, however, it was not 
attached to any other document.  According to Irey and Stein, 
when Irey signed this page, they and Redman had an understanding 
that they were signing a commitment to be obligated by the terms 
and conditions of the 1988 Wage Agreement, but with the promised 
exemption from the 1950 Plan.  Furthermore, Irey and Stein 
claimed that all parties agreed that the signature page would be 
sent to International President Trumpka for his signature.  Then, 
the signature page would be attached to a document identical to 
the Wage Agreement except for the 1950 Plan exemption, and a copy 
would be sent to Fawn Mining.  Redman, however, denied that any 
such agreement existed when he and Irey signed the signature 
page.  He stated that at the time of signing, he believed that 
Fawn Mining was signing onto the entire Wage Agreement, including 
the provision requiring contribution to the 1950 Plan, and that 
the only understanding between the parties was that Redman would 
seek the exemption in one year if it would increase the longevity 
of the mine. 
 One day later, on May 25, 1990, Fawn Mining signed an 
Asset Purchase Agreement for the acquisition of the mine from 
BethEnergy.  Article 3.1.5 of this Asset Purchase Agreement 
stated that Fawn Mining would assume all of BethEnergy's 
obligations and liabilities under the Wage Agreement, and it 
acknowledged that it had copies of this agreement.  The Asset 
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Purchase Agreement did not mention any exemption from the 1950 
Plan.  BethEnergy sent a letter to the UMW on June 4, 1990 
announcing the sale of the mine to Fawn Mining, and stating that 
Fawn Mining had agreed to accept BethEnergy's obligations under 
the Wage Agreement.  This letter also did not mention a waiver of 
any of the agreement's provisions.    
 Once Fawn Mining took over operations it began to make 
remittances to the 1974 Plan, as required by the Wage Agreement. 
It did not, however, make any contributions to the 1950 Plan.  In 
August of 1990, the Plans informed Fawn Mining that they still 
had not received a signed copy of the agreement reached between 
it and District 5, and requested that they be sent one.  Fawn 
Mining responded to the Plans' request by sending them a file it 
kept of information regarding the contract and a copy of the 
signature page signed by representatives from District 5 and Fawn 
Mining.   
 In October 1990, Fawn Mining began to receive notices 
from the 1950 Plan that contributions were owed.0  However, Fawn 
Mining did not respond to any of the Plans' notices.  In fact, it 
did not inform the Plans that it believed it was exempt from 
contributing to the 1950 Plan until April 1992, when it sent the 
Plans a memorandum.  According to Fawn Mining representatives 
Irey and David Chedgy (CLI's President), the reason for this 
delay was that during this time they were attempting to obtain 
from Redman a copy of the agreement showing that the 1950 Plan 
                                                           
0Fawn Mining received from the Plans two delinquency notices in 
October 1990, one in December 1990, and one in January 1992.   
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provision had been excluded, but that Redman was brushing them 
off, stating simply that, "its coming."   
 On December 28, 1990, CLI sent Redman a letter 
regarding the written exemption, which stated, in part: 
 With regard to the economics of the 
operation, you will recall that before the 
deal was cut with Bethlehem, the question of 
payments to the UMWA Health and Retirement 
Funds was discussed with you and we were 
assured, verbally, that we would not have to 
make any contribution to the "50's" Fund.  We 
recently received a demand from the UMWA 
Health and Retirement Fund Administrators for 
payment of overdue contributions to this fund 
of $163,734 for the period June 1, 1990 to 
October 31, 1990. . . . 
 
 . . . We believe it is fair to say that, 
if we had not been given your assurance that 
we would not have to pay into this fund, we 
would not have proceeded with the deal. 
 
 With the [bleak economic] situation we 
are now facing, it is even more important to 
obtain clarification of the position.  We 
feel that it is absolutely essential that a 
written amendment to the original agreement, 
similarly dated, specifically exempting Fawn 
from payments into the "50's" Fund, be drawn 
up and signed by authorized UMWA officials. 
App. 781-82. 
 Due to excessive losses, Fawn Mining ceased operations 
at the mine in February, 1991, just ten months after it purchased 
the mining assets from BethEnergy.  On February 14, 1992, the 
Plans initiated this action seeking delinquent contributions and 
other statutory remedies.   
 In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge 
pointed to case law holding that written contractual obligations 
in collective bargaining agreements control over alleged oral 
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modifications.  See Central States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund 
v. Gerber Truck Serv., Inc., 870 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1989) (en 
banc); Trustees of Laborers Local Union #800 Health and Welfare 
Trust Fund v. Pump House, Inc., 821 F.2d 566 (11th Cir. 1987); 
Southwest Adm'rs, Inc. v. Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d 769 (9th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987).  Further, as 
evidence of Fawn Mining's agreement to assume all of the 
obligations in the Wage Agreement, the magistrate judge pointed 
to its Asset Purchase Agreement with BethEnergy and to the fact 
that Fawn Mining was aware of the Wage Agreement's requirement 
that signatory employers such as BethEnergy could transfer the 
mine only to parties who agreed to abide by the same collective 
bargaining agreement.     
 The magistrate went on to say that even if there was a 
local undisclosed side agreement between the UMW and Fawn Mining 
to waive the 1950 Plan obligations, this type of agreement would 
be irrelevant and not binding on the Plans, because they were not 
a party to the side agreement.  The magistrate judge, citing 
Lewis v. Benedict Coal, 361 U.S. 459 (1960), stated that the only 
potential impact of this side agreement would be on the liability 
of the UMW to Fawn Mining.  However, since he found no legal 
basis for Fawn Mining's indemnity claim, the magistrate judge 
recommended that the UMW's motion for summary judgment be 
granted. 
 
II.  
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 We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
decision to grant appellees' motions for summary judgment.0 
Public Interest Research of N.J. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 76 (3d Cir. 1990) ("In reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, we apply the same test as the district court 
should have used initially.") (citing Erie Telecommunications, 
Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988)), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018 (1991). 
 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may 
grant a motion for summary judgment only if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is subject to 
judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  A dispute 
is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party."  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  A fact is material when 
it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing 
law."  Id.  Any dispute over a fact which is irrelevant or 
unnecessary will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.  Id.   
 The moving party has the initial burden of informing 
the court of the basis for a motion of summary judgment and 
pointing out those parts of the record which he or she believes 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  If the 
                                                           
0The district court had jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.  
§ 185(c), and also under § 502(e) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e). 
We have jurisdiction to review this final judgment of the 
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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moving party can satisfy his or her initial burden, the nonmoving 
party "'may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
[or her] pleadings, but his [or her] response . . .  must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial.'"  Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir.) (quoting 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985). 
However, all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the 
record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion.  Sorba v. Pennsylvania Drilling Co., Inc., 
821 F.2d 200, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1019 
(1988).   
 
III. 
 Fawn Mining's defense to the Plans' motion for summary 
judgment was that it had been affirmatively led by the UMW to 
believe that the agreement it was signing did not require it to 
contribute to the 1950 Plan at any time.  In other words, Fawn 
Mining claimed that the UMW had fraudulently obtained the 
agreement under which the contributions sought were allegedly 
due.  The district court rejected this defense, however, because 
it felt that the Plans were not bound by any undisclosed "side 
agreements" that may have existed between Fawn Mining and the 
UMW.  Apparently, the court believed that Fawn Mining's defense 
to the Plans' summary judgment motion lacked merit regardless of 
whether the UMW committed fraud.  For the reasons that we set 
forth below, however, we believe that the answers to the 
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questions of whether the UMW committed fraud, and, if so, what 
type of fraud, are highly relevant here.   
     The Plans are third-party beneficiaries of the Wage 
Agreement.  Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 977 F.2d 1500, 1505 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (citing Southwest Adm'rs, Inc. v. Rozay's Transfer, 
791 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 
(1987)).  "The rights of third-party beneficiaries typically are 
subject to any defenses that the promisor could assert in a suit 
by the promisee."  Id. (citing John D. Calamari & Joseph M. 
Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 17-10 (3d ed. 1987)).  However, 
third-party beneficiaries are subject to a more limited number of 
defenses when the contract at issue is a collective bargaining 
agreement.  Agathos, 977 F.2d at 1505.  For example, the Supreme 
Court has held that "the parties to a collective bargaining 
agreement must express their meaning in unequivocal words before 
they can be said to have agreed that the union's breaches of its 
promises should give rise to a defense against the duty assumed 
by an employer to contribute to a welfare fund."  Lewis v. 
Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 470-71 (1960), cited in 
Agathos, 977 F.2d at 1505. 
 Moreover, section 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1145, 
speaks to the recoverability of contributions from an employer in 
the position of Fawn Mining.  Section 515 states:   
Every employer who is obligated to make 
contributions to a multi-employer plan under 
the terms of the plan or under the terms of a 
collectively bargained agreement shall, to 
the extent not inconsistent with law, make 
such contributions in accordance with the 
15 
terms and conditions of such plan or 
agreement. 
 The courts have interpreted section 515 as severely 
limiting the defenses available to an employer who has signed an 
agreement which commits it to make contributions to a benefit 
fund.  Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 977 F.2d 1500 (3d Cir. 1992).0 
Our review of the case law in the Agathos case, for example, 
revealed that "an employer may not assert defects in the 
formation of the collective bargaining agreement, such as . . . 
fraud in the inducement or oral promises to disregard the text of 
the agreement."  Id. at 1505 (citations omitted).  Indeed, we 
concluded that the cases recognized only three defenses.  One of 
those defenses, however, is possibly relevant here.  Claims for 
contributions delinquent under the terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement can be defeated if it is shown that "the 
collective bargaining agreement is void ab initio, as where there 
is fraud in the execution, and not merely voidable, as in the 
case of fraudulent inducement."  Id. 
 Accordingly, the crucial issue in this case is whether 
the defense that Fawn Mining has asserted is one of fraud in the 
inducement or fraud in the execution.  If we decide that the 
claim is one of fraud in the inducement, we must affirm the 
decision of the district court to grant the Plans' motion for 
summary judgment, as this is an invalid defense for an employer 
                                                           
0See also, Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d at 773 ("In recognition of 
the fact that millions of workers depend upon employee benefit 
trust funds for their retirement security, Congress and the 
courts have acted to simplify trust fund collection actions by 
restricting the availability of contract defenses, which make 
collection actions unnecessarily cumbersome and costly.").   
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to use in response to a benefit plan's claim for delinquent 
contributions.  However, if we find that Fawn Mining has asserted 
a claim of fraud in the execution, and, furthermore, that there 
exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the UMW 
committed such fraud, we must reverse the summary judgment in 
favor of the Plans.    
 As stated by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit, the distinction between fraud in the inducement and 
fraud in the execution is that, "[t]he former induces a party to 
assent to something he otherwise would not have; the latter 
induces a party to believe the nature of his act is something 
entirely different than it actually is."  Rozay's Transfer, 791 
F.2d at 774 (citing 12 Walter H.E. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts 
§ 1488, at 332 (3d ed. 1970)).  The court went on to explain 
that, "'[f]raud in the execution' arises when a party executes an 
agreement 'with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to 
obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms.' . . . 
Fraud in the execution results in the agreement being void ab 
initio, whereas fraud in the inducement makes the transaction 
merely voidable."  Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(c)) (other 
citations omitted).    
 On several prior occasions, courts have been required 
to apply this distinction in order to determine whether an 
employer's asserted defense to a benefit fund's claim for 
delinquent contributions was valid.  In Agathos v. Starlite 
Motel, 977 F.2d 1500, 1505 (3d Cir. 1992), for example, the 
employer argued before us that he was not responsible for 
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payments to a benefit fund as the fund had claimed, because even 
though the collective bargaining agreement specified that all 
employees would be included in the benefit fund, the employer and 
the union had orally agreed that only two of the employees would 
be covered.  This court held that this defense was one of fraud 
in the inducement rather than fraud in the execution, and, 
therefore, that it was an invalid defense under the 
circumstances.  According to the court, "[t]o prevail on a 
defense of fraud in the execution, a party must show 'excusable 
ignorance of the contents of the writing signed.'"  Id. at 1505-
06 (citing Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d at 774 (quoting U.C.C. § 3-
305 cmt. 7); Calamari & Perillo, supra, § 9-22 (party claiming 
fraud in the execution must show that he "signed an instrument 
that is radically different from that which [he] is led to 
believe that he is signing")).  The court concluded that in the 
case before it, the employer made no such showing because it did 
"not argue that it thought the collective bargaining agreement it 
signed was a different document[,] [n]or did [it] contend that 
the Union misrepresented the nature of the document it was asked 
to sign."  Id. at 1506. 
 In Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas 
Pension Fund v. Gerber Truck Service, Inc., 870 F.2d 1148 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (en banc), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit was faced with a virtually identical situation and 
reached the same conclusion.  According to the benefit fund, the 
employer had made contributions for only three of his employees 
rather than all of them.  The employer's defense was that 
18 
although the collective bargaining agreement stated that all 
employees would be included in the benefit fund, it and the union 
had orally agreed that only three specific employees would 
participate in the fund.  The court held that the employer was 
liable for benefit fund contributions for all of his employees, 
as stated in the contract.  In so holding, the court rejected the 
employer's defense because it found it to be one of fraud in the 
inducement, which is an invalid defense to a claim for 
contributions by a benefit fund.  Id. at 1153 ("If the employer 
simply points to a defect in its formation--such as fraud in the 
inducement, oral promises to disregard the text, or the lack of 
majority support for the union and the consequent ineffectiveness 
of the pact under labor law--it must still keep its promise to 
the pension plans.").      
 As yet another example, in Rozay's Transfer, a benefit 
fund had filed a claim against the employer for delinquent 
contributions that had accrued after the previous collective 
bargaining agreement had expired but before a new agreement had 
been reached.  The employer's defense was that the union had 
promised it that the benefit fund would waive these contribution 
requirements, and that it had signed the collective bargaining 
agreement under the belief that this waiver had been approved. 
The benefit fund had rejected the union's request for such a 
waiver, however, and the union had failed to convey this 
rejection to the employer.  The court held that the employer's 
defense was one of fraud in the inducement, and not one of fraud 
in the execution.  Specifically, the court stated that: 
19 
 Rozay's Transfer cannot persuasively 
contend that fraud in the execution is 
presented on the facts of this case.  Rozay 
acknowledged at trial that he was fully aware 
that the document he signed was a collective 
bargaining agreement and that the agreement 
was effective as of [the day that the 
original agreement expired], thus obligating 
the payment of contributions to the trust 
fund for the disputed period. 
 
 To maintain a defense of fraud in the 
execution, Rozay's Transfer would have to 
establish "excusable ignorance of the terms 
of the contents of the writing signed."  See 
Uniform Commercial Code § 3-305 comment 7. 
But there simply was no confusion as to the 
actual contents of the agreement.  Instead 
the misrepresentation concerned whether the 
express provisions of the agreement would in 
fact be enforced--an example of fraud in the 
inducement, as the district court found. 
791 F.2d at 774-75.  The Rozay's Transfer court rejected the 
employer's defense, citing Southern California Retail Clerks 
Union and Food Employers Joint Pension Trust Fund v. Bjorklund, 
728 F.2d 1262, 1266 (9th Cir. 1984), for the proposition that "a 
claim that a promise to make contributions was fraudulently 
induced is not a legitimate defense to a trust fund's action to 
recover delinquent contributions."  Rozay's Transfer, 791 F.2d at 
775. 
     The court in Rozay's Transfer distinguished its facts 
from those of a prior Ninth Circuit case, Operating Engineers 
Pension Trust v. Gilliam, 737 F.2d 1501, 1503 (9th Cir. 1984). In 
Gilliam, an employer claimed that he had signed a document which 
the union had told him was an application to become a union 
member as an owner-operator.  In actuality, however, the document 
was a collective bargaining agreement covering all of his 
20 
employees, which required him to make contributions to a trust 
fund on their behalf.  The trust fund later filed a claim against 
the employer for delinquent contributions due under the 
agreement.  The court held that the employer "was not obligated 
to make such payments as he had reasonably relied on the union's 
representation that he was signing a document of a wholly 
different nature."  791 F.2d at 774 (citing Gilliam, 737 F.2d at 
1504-05).  The Rozay's Transfer court said that the key 
distinction between its facts and the facts of Gilliam was that 
the employer in Gilliam had asserted the valid defense of fraud 
in the execution, while the employer in Rozay's Transfer had 
asserted the invalid defense of fraud in the inducement. 
 With these cases in mind, we turn to the facts at hand. 
As pointed out by Fawn Mining, on the day that the signature page 
was signed embodying the existence of an agreement between the 
parties, there was significant time pressure on both sides due to 
the fact that the mine was set to close the next day.  The only 
document that the parties physically had before them was a 
signature page of a standard Wage Agreement.  Although no 
document was attached to this page at the time, Fawn Mining 
claims that both sides intended the signing of this page to 
symbolize their agreement to all terms of the Wage Agreement 
other than the 1950 Plan provision and that both contemplated 
that this page, when formally executed by an appropriate official 
of the International, would be appended to a copy of the Wage 
Agreement with the 1950 Plan provision deleted.  According to 
Stein: 
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[There was a] need to sign the agreement 
because of the impending closing on the asset 
purchase agreement the next day.  Mr. Irey 
was very hesitant to sign that agreement 
because it did not -- we had no written . . . 
documentation of our waiver from the '50's 
funds.  Mr. Redman assured him that that had 
been approved by Mr. Trumpka and it would be 
forthcoming with the signed agreement by Mr. 
Trumpka. 
App. 609-10. 
 Unlike the employers in the fraudulent inducement 
cases, Fawn Mining does not claim there was an oral modification 
of a written collective bargaining agreement it had signed. 
According to Fawn Mining, it did not knowingly enter into an 
agreement to contribute to the 1950's Fund with the expectancy 
that the agreement would not be enforced or the obligation later 
waived.  Rather, Fawn Mining and Redman signed the unattached 
signature page the day before Fawn Mining's closing with 
BethEnergy to permit the transfer of the mine assets and to avoid 
mine closure.  The parties' agreement and understanding at the 
time the page was signed was that there was no contractual 
obligation on the part of Fawn Mining to contribute to the 1950 
Benefit Fund.   
 We hold that Fawn Mining is asserting a defense of 
fraud in the execution, which, if proven, would be a valid 
defense to the Plans' claim.  Fawn Mining's defense is equivalent 
to a claim of "excusable ignorance of the contents of the writing 
signed."  Furthermore, because both Fawn Mining and the UMW admit 
that the 1950 Plan provision was an important issue to both 
parties, if Fawn Mining was in fact led to believe that it was 
signing an agreement that did not include this provision, an 
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agreement that did contain this provision would be "radically 
different" from one which did not require contribution to the 
plan.  Therefore, Fawn Mining's defense falls within the 
definition of fraud in the execution that this court laid out in 
Agathos.  Additionally, we believe that the facts of this case 
more closely resemble those of Gilliam than they do those of 
Gerber or Rozay's Transfer because here Fawn Mining is claiming 
that it was misled as to what the actual language of the contract 
would be.  It is not asserting that it signed a contract, the 
terms of which were as it intended them to be, but did so only 
because it was misled about the existence of a side agreement.  
 If an employer reviews a document reflecting the 
agreements reached in collective bargaining and the union 
surreptitiously substitutes a materially different contract 
document before both sides execute it, we think it clear that 
there has been a fraud in the execution of the contract and that 
the agreement reflected in the executed document is void ab 
initio and unenforceable by the union.  The employer has never 
manifested an assent to the terms of the alleged contract, and 
the written document purporting to evidence the agreement has 
been obtained by fraud. 
 We believe the situation before us is not materially 
different.  Under the facts here alleged by Fawn Mining, the 
Plans are suing on what purports to be a written contract.  The 
employer has never manifested assent to the terms contained in 
that contract, however, and the document itself has been procured 
by fraud.  In our view, the fact that the union allegedly 
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substituted the body of the contract document after the execution 
of the signature page, rather than before, does not convert this 
suit from a fraud in the execution case into a fraud in the 
inducement one. 
 Because Fawn Mining is asserting a fraud in the 
execution defense and because the conflicting deposition 
testimony raises genuine issues of material fact regarding this 
defense (i.e. whether the UMW actually did lead Fawn Mining to 
believe that the 1950 Plan provision would not be included in the 
language of the agreement), we will reverse the summary judgment 
in favor of the Plans.0 
 The UMW argues that even if we find that Fawn Mining's 
defense is valid in theory because the parties intended this 
agreement to exclude the 1950 Plan provision, we must still 
reject it because any evidence of such an intent would be 
                                                           
0It is true, as the district court stressed, that the Asset 
Purchase Agreement specifically committed Fawn Mining to assume 
all obligations of the Wage Agreement, and that Fawn Mining 
failed promptly to notify the Plans that the collective 
bargaining agreement it had signed with the UMW did not include 
the 1950 Plan provision.  While these two facts provide a basis 
for an inference adverse to Fawn Mining, they would not preclude 
a trier of fact from accepting the version of the facts reflected 
in the depositions of Irey and Stein.  Even though Fawn Mining 
obligated itself to BethEnergy to assume all of its obligations 
under the 1988 Wage Agreement, including that to the 1950 Plan, 
Fawn Mining could well have negotiated with the UMW with the view 
that a concession by it regarding the 1950 Plan would render 
insignificant its commitment to BethEnergy concerning that Plan. 
Moreover, the fact that Fawn Mining contributed to the 1974 Plan, 
which was the other plan specified in the Wage Agreement, 
evidences that Fawn Mining was not trying to shirk all 
obligations to contribute to a welfare or pension fund, thereby 
providing some support for Fawn Mining's claim that it was led to 
believe from the start that the 1950 Plan provision was excluded 
from its agreement with the UMW. 
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inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.  For support, it 
cites Wilkes Barre Printing Pressman and Assistants' Union, No. 
137 I.P.P. & A.E. v. Great Northern Press, 522 F.Supp. 106, 109 
(M.D. Pa. 1981), which held that, "[o]nce the existence of a 
binding contract has been established, [parol evidence to 
challenge the stated terms of a collective bargaining agreement] 
will be disallowed as part of a general policy to protect workers 
from collusive oral agreements between management and the union 
leadership."  The UMW also points to Lewis v. Seanor Coal, 382 
F.2d 437, 441-45 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 947 
(1968), which held that parol evidence of oral modifications to 
written contractual terms is inadmissible.   
 The UMW's parol evidence argument is unpersuasive. 
While the parol evidence rule generally prohibits the admission 
of evidence that contradicts the terms of an integrated, 
unambiguous writing, the "rule does not apply to evidence 
introduced to show that a contract was void or voidable." Coleman 
v. Holecek, 542 F.2d 532, 535 (10th Cir. 1976). Therefore, 
"events antecedent to the making of a contract which negate 
mutuality of assent, such as duress or fraud, or demonstrate a 
condition to be fulfilled before the obligations of the contract 
are to vest, may also be the subject of parol evidence."  4 
Walter H.E. Jaeger, Williston on Contracts § 631, at 950 (3d ed. 
1961).  In the case at hand, Fawn Mining has tendered evidence 
which it claims would show the existence of fraud in the 
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execution, thereby making the contract void.  Such evidence is 
not prohibited by the parol evidence rule.0 
IV. 
 Finally, we turn to Fawn Mining's claim for indemnity 
from the UMW.  Paragraph 23 of Fawn Mining's Third Party 
Complaint against the UMW alleges as follows: 
 23.  Any liability of Fawn Mining to 
Plaintiffs for contributions allegedly due to 
the 1950 Benefit Plan, which is denied, is 
the result of the UMW and District 5's 
negligent or fraudulent representations which 
induced Fawn Mining to purchase the 
BethEnergy mine assets under the assumption 
and agreement that Fawn Mining would not be 
required to contribute or to otherwise 
participate in the 1950 Benefit Plan. 
                                                           
0Contrary to the UMW's assertion, the general rule that a signer 
of an instrument is bound by its terms regardless of whether the 
signer read the instrument is inapplicable here. This is so 
because Fawn Mining is claiming that the UMW led it to believe 
that the parties were signing an instrument which was completely 
different from that which the UMW claims Fawn Mining signed.  See 
Gilliam, 737 F.2d at 1504 ("We recognize that a party who signs a 
written agreement generally is bound by its terms, even though he 
neither reads it nor considers the legal consequences of signing 
it.  This proposition, however, is qualified by the principle 
that he who signs a document reasonably believing it is something 
quite different than it is cannot be bound to the terms of the 
document.  For example, one who signs a promissory note 
reasonably believing he only gave his autograph is not liable on 
the note." (citations omitted)). 
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App. 77. 
 While Fawn Mining asserts a fraud in the execution 
defense to the Plans' claim against it for contribution, it here 
alleges, in the alternative, fraud in the inducement of its asset 
purchase contract with BethEnergy as a basis for an indemnity 
claim against the UMW in the event it is held liable to the 
Plans.  As we have indicated, there is a material dispute of fact 
as to precisely what role the UMW played in the negotiations 
leading to Fawn Mining's acquisition of the mine facility.  Based 
on the current record, we believe a trier of fact could choose 
not to credit Fawn Mining's contentions with respect to the 
significance of the signing of the unattached signature page and 
could still conclude that it was induced to sign the Asset 
Purchase Agreement by the UMW representation that contributions 
to the 1950 Plan would be waived.  In that event, it seems to us 
that Fawn Mining could be held liable to the Plans and, at the 
same time, could be entitled to indemnity from the UMW for the 
contributions it would have to pay.  Accordingly, we conclude 
that summary judgment for the UMW on the Third Party Complaint 
was inappropriate.  
  
V.   
 For these reasons, we will reverse the district court's 
summary judgments in favor of the Plans and the UMW and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
